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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BENNY CRUZ,

Appellant,
vs.

DEPART~IEN'l'

I

OF EJ\IPLOYMEN'f SECURITY AND BOARD )
OF REVIEW OF TlIE INDGSTRIAL COl\11\IISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents . .

c:~~i!0 •

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ST ATEMEN'f OF CASE
Petition for review challenging the Department of
Employment Security as affirmed by the Appeals
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah holding appellant, Benny Cruz,
to be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits under Section 35-4-5 ( d) UCA, 1953,
by reason of the fact that he was involved in a strike at
the time of his application for benefits.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the
Board of Review and an order granting Appellant Ult·
employment compensation benefits.

STATEl\iENT OF .FACTS
The Appellant was employed by Kennecott Copper
Corporation on February 24, 1955, as heavy dutv
equipment operator and was so employed on July lj,
1967, when his work ceased due to a strike at that corporation. He was a member of Operating Engineers Lo·
cal #3 and as a member, he honored the picket line.
During the strike he did not at any time contact the
company to go to work. ( TR-0022) . The Appellant had
a supplemental job working for Pioneer Sand and
Gravel Company which began on April 20, 1967 and
ended on December 20, 1967, when he was laid off due
to weather conditions. ( TR-0020) ( TR-0024). He did
not quit his job with Kennecott Copper Corporation
and during the strike he maintained his union member·
ship, seniority rights, and other benefits. (TR-0026).
In order to maintain his group insurance he had to pay
the premiums during the strike. ( TR-0028) . He ex·
pected to be called back after the strike was settled; and
he was called back, and he returned to work on March
31, 1968. (TR-0023) (TR-0025).
His work with Pioneer Sand and Gravel was es·
sentially seasonal. He testified that he planned to re·
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turn to work there "as soon as it dries out enough to be

able to work the ground ... " ( TR-0024). His work with

the company was that of operating bulldozers. (TH0021). His base pay with Kennecott was $24.36 per
r•ight-hour day plus fringe benefits, plus time and onehalf for the sixth day of work. At Pioneer his base pay
was $3.00 per hour with no fringe benefits and straight
time when he worked over 40 hours per week. (TR0023).

When he was laid off due to weather conditions by
Pioneer, he filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits and the Department determined that he
was unemployed due to the stoppage of work which
existed because of the strike.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
I.

APPELLANT WAS AN E.MPLOYEE
OF KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE
STRIKE.
2.

HE 'VAS UNElHPLOYED DUE TO THE
STOPPAGE OF WORK 'VHICH EXISTED
BECAUSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE
WAS INVOLVED.
3.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSE AND POLICY O.F THE EM.
PLOY.NIENT SECURITY ACT.
The Utah Employment Security Act was adopted
in recognition that:
"35-4-2 . . . . Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of this state.
Unemployment is therefore a subject of genml
interest and concern which requires appropriate
action by the Legislature to prevent its spread
and to lighten its burden which now so often
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed
worker and his family. The achievement of social
security requires protection against this greatest
hazard of our economic life. This objective can
be furthered by operating free public employ·
ment offices in affiliation with a nationwide sys·
tern of employment services, by devising appro·
priate methods for reducing the volume of un·
employment and by the systematic accumulation
of funds during periods of employment from
which benefits may be paid for periods of un·
employment, thus maintaining purchasing power
and limiting the serious social consequences of
unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, d~
clares that in its considered judgment the public
good, and the general welfare of the. citizens of
this state require the enactment of this measure.
under the police power of the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public employ-
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ment offices and for the compulsory setting aside
of unemployment i:eserves to be used for the
benefit of unemployed persons."
The Legislature recognized that certain unemployments arise by reason of voluntary acts of individuals
and that, therefore, disqualifications should be assessed.
Section 35-4-5 was enacted to establish conditions of ineligibility in cases of voluntarily leaving work, discharge
for misconduct, failure to apply for or accept suitable
work, and for individuals who became unemployed due
to stoppages of work which existed because of strikes.
Section 35-4-5 ( d) provides:
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
"(d) For any week in which it is found by the
commission that his unemployment is due to a
stoppage of work which exists because of a strike
involving his grade, class, or group of workers
at the factory or establishment at which he is or
w~ last employed." (Emphasis added.)
The Court's attention is called to the fact that the
Appellant, on Page 50 of his brief, misquotes the section by leaving out the word "is" in the last line thereof.
This same omission occurs when the Appellant refers to
the statutes applicable to the Bruley case.
This Court in the case of Gus P. Lexes, et al vs.
The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Department of Employment Security, and American

5

Smelting and Refining Company, 121 Ut. 551, 243 p ·.
2d 964, said:
,:
"The 'Utah Unemployment Reserve Law' a~][ :
was first known was enacted in 1953, Chapter 38 '
Laws of Utah 1935. Section 1 declared that th~
policy of the act was to lessen the burden of in·
voluntary employment 'which now so often falls
with crushing force upon the unemployed worker :
and his family.' The act was designed to establish •
'financial reserves for the benefit of persons un. ·
employed through no fault of their own.' At that
time this nation was in the throes of a great economic depression. The purpose of providing un- •
employment benefits was twofold: first, to allevi· ·
ate the need of the worker and his family who
found no market for their services and were de·
prived of wages by the general business collapse;
second, it was a 'pump-priming' measure to pro·
vide increased buying power and thereby stimu·
late our economic system. In present times of ,
prosperity, neither of these objectives would be
served by granting benefits to the present claim·
ants. Future times may present occasions when
the cushioning effect of unemployment compen·
sation may arrest the course of a narrowing down·
ward economic spiral so as to make pump-priming
in its raw form unnecessary. Labor's right to seek
higher wages by concerted lawful economic pr~s
sure is recognized but the labor force which
chooses to strike in order to enforce its demands
cannot be classified as involuntarily unemployed.
It is specifically disqualified from receiving com·
pensation by statute. Those who are in sympath~:
with the striking body and stay away from then
available jobs in order to uphold the reciproc~l
pact amongst laboring forces to honor each others
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picket lines cannot logically be placed in any
other category. "\Ve believe that consideration of
the background and general purpose of unemployment legislation is what has prompted the
courts to hold that the decision of an employee
not to cross a picket line which surrounds his
place of work cannot be deemed an involuntary
act."
It appears clear that it is the policy of the Act to

rleny benefits to an individual who remains attached to
an employer where there is a stoppage of work due to a
strike in which the individual is directly involved.

POINT II

1

APPELLANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE
STRIKE.

Section 35-4-5 ( d), supra, denies benefits to the
individual with respect to any week during which he is
i still employed by a struck employer where he is involved
in the strike.
1

The first question that arises is whether or not one
who is on strike is no longer to be considered an employee
of the struck employer. The authorities appear to be
quite unanimous that the relation of employee and employer is not terminated by reason of the strike.
In Jeffery-De,Vitt Insulator Co. vs. National La-

7

bor Relations Bd., 91 F. 2d 134 ( 4 Cir.,
A.L.R. 948, the court stated:

1937),

11 ~

'·It h~s loug been rec:ognized by the law, a~
well as m c:ommon understanding, that the rela~ionship existin.g betwe~n employer and employee
1s not nec:essanly tenmnated by a strike. As wa~
well said by Judge Baker, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in
:Michaelson vs. Cnited States, 291 F. 940, 9 4~:
'In the case of a controversy over wages and conditions of work in a private and local industry we
agree with counsel for plaintiffs in error that a
"strike" does not of itself terminate the relatiou
of employer and employee. A controversy arises,
and the employees, then at work, say to their employer: "'Ve shall stop work until you are in what
we may consider a more reasonable state of mind.
'ye shall deprive you of our labor as a legitimate
means of exerting economic pressure to induce
you to yield. If we do go out, we shall remain at
hand, ready to negotiate with you concerning
fair wages and working rules, and ready to re·
turn to work the moment we can agree." If, by
reason of a failure to agree, the employees stop
their work, a "strike" is on. They are no longer
working and receiYing wages: but, in the absence
of anv action other than above indicated looking
to a termination of the relationship, they are en·
titled to rank as "employees." with the adj~ctire
"striking" defining their immediate status.
1

* * *

"In State ,·s. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 P.
.;9 i
in sustainino· a conviction under-.., thet
v--±',
Kansas Industrial Court Act. the Supreme l ll~Jl'
of that state said: 'It may be noted that a strike

.;90 ,.
...,_

~

~
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1s not a quitting of employment. The man who
goes out on a strike does not profess to quit his
employment. He still lays claim to his position
and asserts a right to go back and take it at more
adnmtageous terms.'"

See also Iron )loulder's Union vs. Allis-Chalmers Co.

\C.C.A. 7th) 166 F. 45, 52, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315;
Tri-City Central Trades Council vs. American Steel
Foundries ( C.C.A. 7th) 238 F. 728, 733; Dail-Overland Co. vs. "'"illys-Overland, Inc. (D.C.) 263 F. 171,
188.

In Burger vs. Unemployment Compensation Board

of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 89, 77 A. 2d 737, the Court said:

""'"here there is a labor dispute, whether it
takes the form of a strike or a lock-out, the relation of employer and employee is not severed, but
continues until the dispute is settled or until the
employee secures other employment."
POINT III
HE \VAS UNE~1PLOYED DUE TO THE
STOPPAGE OF \VORK WHICH EXISTED
BECACSE OF THE STRIKE IN WHICH HE
WAS INVOLVED.

Since the strike does not terminate the relation of
employer-employee, we go to the next question, does the
continuance or the taking of other employment after
the beginning of the stoppage of work which exists because of the strike dissolve the employer-employee relationship?
9

This Court has not passed on the specific question
of the effect of supplemental or intervening employment
on the matter of the claimant's eligibility for unemplorment compensation benefits. From the following cas~s
it appears to be the general rule that mere evidence of
supplemental or intervening employment subsequent to
the strike, standing alone is not sufficient. The burden
of establishing Appellant's eligibility for unemployment
compensation benefits rests upon him.
The landmark case appears to be Hopkins vs. California Employment Com., 24 Cal. 2d 744, 151 P. 2d
299, 154 A.L.R. 1081 Annot., decided in 1944. There
the court stated:
"Section 56 (a) of the California U nemploy·
ment Insurance Act, under which claimants were
originally disqualified, provides that 'An individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment, and no such benefit shall be payable to
him * * * (a) If he left his work because of a
trade dispute and for the period during which he
continues out of work by reason of the fact that
the trade dispute is still in active progress in the
establishment in which he was employed. Stats.
1939, ch 7, Sec. 4, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939
Supp. Act 8780d, Sec. 56 (a) . A claimant is thus
ineligible for benefits if the trade dispute is the
direct cause of his continuing out of work. If a
claimant who leaves his work because of a trade
dispute subsequently obtains a permanent fulltime job, however, he is no longer out ~f work
and the continuity of his unemployment 1s brok·
en. If he loses his new job for reasons unrelated
to the dispute, he is unemployed by reason, not

10

of the trade dispute, but of the loss of the new
employment....
"The termination of a claimant's disqualification by subsequent employment thus depends on
whether it breaks the continuity of the claimant's
unemployment and the causal connection between
his unemployment and the trade dispute. Such
employment must be bona fide and not a device
to circumvent the statute .. [Citing cases.}

"It must sever completely the relation between
the striking employee and his former employer.
The strike itself simply suspends the employeremployee relationship but does not terminate it.
[Citing cases.] Mere temporary or casual work
does not sever this relationship for it does not
effectively replace the former employment. The
worker expects its termination and does not look
forward to that continuity of work and income
that characterizes permanent employment. [Citing cases.] Similarly, part-time employment of
a claimant does not break the casual relation between the trade dispute and his unemployment.
[Citing cases.] Only permanent full-time employment can terminate the disqualification. If
bona fide, it completely replaces the claimant's
former employment, terminating whatever relation existed between the claimant and his
former employer. It must be judged prospectively rather than retrospectively, with regard to the
character of the employment, how it was obtained,
and whether it was in the regular course of the
employer's business and the customary occupation of the claimant. [Citing cases.] In the absence of special circumstances, employment of a
short duration admits of an inference that it was
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not entered into in good faith with the intent
that it be permanent.

* * *

"In the remaining cases the commission could
not ~easonably conclude that the claimants had
obtamed permanent full-time employment and
had completely severed their relations with their
former employers. The undisputed evidence
shows that the work secured by the claimants
during the hotel strike was stop-gap employment
and that the claimants had not forf.~ited their employment in the struck establishments."
In 1960 the matter was before the Pennsylvania
court in Oluschak vs. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 255, 159 A. 2d 750, and we
quote from their opinion:
" ... The record indicates that the claimant
while on strike at Westinghouse, sought and ob·
tained employment at H. W. Butterworth &
Sons, Philmont Road, Bethayers, Pa. The em·
ployment began on October 23, 1955, and ended
by lay-off on March 9, 1956. Ile did not at any
time sever his employment or resign from the job
at Westinghouse nor did he give to his employer
or anyone else any indication of an intention so
to do. He testified that the new job paid $1.7J
per hour plus bonus, on piece work, and his job
at \Vestinghouse paid, prior to the strike, $2.10\;
cents per hour; that it was similar work; that I
said I would stay if the job was dependable be·
cause with the bonus, it would be the same as I
was getting and I said if I made out, I would
stay there'; and that he joined the union but con·
tinued his membership in the \Vestinghouse
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union. He remained on the Westinghouse payroll as one of the striking employees, with all the
benefits of fifteen years seniority, insurance and
other incidents of that employment. After said
strike, he was recalled, and with other employees
of 'Vestinghouse received the additional benefits
won by the strike.

*

*

*

"The burden was upon the claimant to prove
he was entitled to unemployment compensation
benefits. Smith Unemployment Compensation
Case, 1950, 167 Pa. Super, 242, 74 A. 2d 523. An
unemployed person because of a labor dispute,
can only recoyer unemployment compensation
when he can prove that he is not directly interested, and that he is not a member of the striking
union and that he is not in the same grade or class
of workers as the strikers. Curcio Unemployment
Compensation Case, supra; Stahlman Unemployment Compensation Case, 1958, 187 Pa. Super,
246, 144 A. 2d 670. In this case the claimant must
establish, that although at the time of the strike
he was disqualified under Section 402 ( d), he
now comes within subsections ( 1) , ( 2) and ( 3) ,
by showing he obtained a new job and severed his
employment with 'Vestinghouse. The evidence
of an intervening job, standing alone, is not sufficient. Such a job could be stop-gap, part-time
or temporary employment accepted during the
strike for economic reasons. The claimant could
continue to be 'participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work' and could still be "a member of an
organization which is p,;irticipating in, or directly
interested in, the labor dispute which caused the
stoppage of work' and could be in the same grade
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or class of worke_rs as the st~ikers. His recall at
the ~nd of ~he stnke by W ~stmghouse is evidenct
of lus contmued
memberslup in the union and li I'
.
l I~amtenance of his employee status on the
tie
Westmghouse payroll, from which it can be inferred that he continued to be 'directly interested
in the outcome of the labor dispute."
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Ankrum vs. Em.
ployment Security Agency (Idaho 1961), 361 P. ~<l
795, that the burden is upon a claimant to establish his
eligibility for benefits whenever his claim therefor i1
questioned.
When Appellant was laid off by the Pioneer Sand
and Gravel Company, he continued to be unemployed
solely by reason of the strike in which he was involved
and through which he hoped to receive higher pay and
other benefits. He stood ready to return to Kennecott
whether or not he was working for Pioneer when the
strike ended. He recognized that he had an employee
relationship with Kennecott and retained his seniority
rights. ( TR-0025) . Appellant obtained his job with
Pioneer in 1966 while working for Kennecott. He was
impelled to work the two jobs concurrently with the
Pioneer job supplementing his Kennecott job because
of extensive medical and therapeutic expenses being con·
tinuously incurred in connection with a son's illness,
( TR-0025) . He said, "And this is my reason for having
worked these jobs." In the cases discussed above, the
courts were looking to see what effects intervening.
supplemental, or stop-gap employment had on the in·
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lentions of the claimant with reference to his claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. In other words,
did the claimant or the claimants intend to substitute
the new employment for the "struck" employment?
In Calvin B. Scott vs. UCC, and Anaconda Co.,
141 Mont. 230, 376 P. 2d 733, decided under identical
statutory provisions, the court examined the leading
cases in the several states including a number of those
cited by Respondent and concluded:
"l. The burden is upon claimant to show he is
not disqualified.

"2. The taking of other employment by a claimant while on strike, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish that burden.

"3. The new employment must not be of the
stop-gap, part-time or temporary type, but rather
of the permanent full-time type without intention of returning to the struck employer at the
termination of the strike.
"4. The new employment must have been undertaken in good faith and be of the type formerly engaged in by the employee or for which he
would be skilled and competent.

"5. There must exist a complete and bona fide
severance of his employment with the struck employer."

In the Scott case, supra, all of the claimants were
members of the union that called the strike with the employer and caused their unemployment; each found some
form of new employment during the course of the strike
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and then, upon losing or quitting same before the en<l
of the strike, filed for benefits. All responded to notices
of recall at the conclusion of the dispute. The decision of
the court was that:
"A strike does not sever the employer-employet
relationship. The burden of showing that this
relationship is severed by new employment is
upon the claimant. At best, claimants evidenced
reluctance to quit or renounce their seniority
rights with the struck employer and most admitted that they viewed their new work as stop-gap
employment and that they did return at the end
of the strike. Therefore, .under the substantial·
evidence rule, the lower courts were without
authority to reverse the benefit denials imposed
by the Commission."
In the instant case, the Appellant testified that he
considered himself to be an employee of Kennecott
Copper Corporation all during the period of the strike
and that he retained his several rights as an employee of
Kennecott. It is very clear from the record that his em·
ployment with Pioneer Sand and Gravel Company wa~
secured in order to supplement and not be a substitute
for his employment with Kennecott. There is only one
reason why the claimant was unemployed and continued
to be unemployed after he was laid off by Pioneer Sand
and Gravel and that reason was that the claimant, his
union and other unions, were involved in a strike at Ken·
necott Copper Corporation which brought about a stoppage of work. In the Scott case, supra, the court said:
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"Having reviewed the records before us of the
various claimants, it appears that in no case did
the claimant sustain his burden of proving he was
not disqualified, and in no case did a claimant
show a complete and bona fide severance of his
employment ~ith the struck employer.
"Further, no claimant proved that he had no
intention of returning for work for the struck
employer at the termination of the strike."
The Appellant, in his brief, relies strongly on the
case of Bruley vs. Industrial Commission, 101 So. 2d 22
(Fla.) . In the Bruley case, supra, the court stated:
"The facts upon which the matter was determined are simple. Appellant was employed as a
bartender, at the Roney Plaza Hotel in :Miami
Beach, for approximately a year and a half before a strike which began in April of 1955. He
quit his job and participated in the strike, and
was paid strike benefits for a number of weeks.
"In December of the year he became employed
on a regular basis as bartender in another hotel
called the Blue Waters Hotel. He continued to
work at the Blue 'Vaters Hotel until he was discharged nine months later. It was following his
discharge from that last employment that he
made application for the unemployment compensation which was denied him.

* * *

''"\Vhether such subsequent employment is to
be regarded as 'stop-gap' in the sense in which
that term is used by the commission, is one which
can vary from case to case, depending on the facts
of each case. The length or brevity of the subse-
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9~ent employme_nt may have a bearing. Basica]],
it is a matter of mtent and good faith.
l

"If the new employme:qt is undertaken in good r
faith, and with intent on the part of the employee ,
to continue therein on a permanent basis or for
an indefinite period, he will have insulated him.
self against the 'cause' of unemployment which
he suffered initially as a result of the labor dispute at the place of prior employment."
In the Scott vs. UCC case, supra, the court in re·
ferring to the Bruley case, supra, stated:
". . . The court from the record before it felt
the work was 'new employment; entered in good
faith and regarded by the employee as being permanent or for an indefinite period."
The Court stated further:

"It will readily be seen that none of these cases"
(referring to the Bruley case and others) "de·
viate from the principles we have heretofore out·
lined ..."
The principles referred to were those cited earlier
in this brief by the court in the Scott case.
In the Bruley case, supra, the court found that a!
a matter of fact, the claimant had obtained new work
and had no intention of relying on the struck employer
in the future unless perhaps he lost his second employment. In the instant case, we have no such factual situ·
ation. From the record and the testimony, it is clear that
the Appellant considered his employment with Pioneer
as secondary and supplemental and he considered him·
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1

I

!

self to be a regular permanent employee of Kennecott
Copper Corporation.
Therefore, it is clear that the Department, as affirmed by the Board of Review, had no choice in view
of the obvious intentions of Appellant but to deny benefits on the grounds that the Appellant was, at the time
he filed his claims for unemployment compensation
benefits, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation and that the only reason he was unemployed was
because there was a stoppage of work due to a strike in
which he was involved.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission denying unemployment compensation
to the Appellant was founded upon substantial evidence
and its decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS:
Vernon B. Romney
Attorney General
Fred F. Dremann, Special
Assistant Attorney General
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